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Abstract : (JEL classifications G23, P35, J26) 
Seven years ago, Kazakhstan embarked on a dramatic reform of its pension and social security 
system in order to move from a public defined benefit (“solidarity”) system to one of defined 
mandatory contributions (accumulative system). At the same time, Kyrgyzstan embarked on a 
move to a notional defined contribution (NDC) system that has made little progress. Today, 
major reforms are being planned in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as well. This paper surveys 
the reforms that have taken place, discusses the planned reforms, and places them in the 
underlying fiscal and demographic contexts of the various countries in the region. 
 
                                                           
* This research has been funded in part by the US Agency for International Development. We are grateful 
to the Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Pragma Corporation for data and 
logistical support.  We especially thank Ilhom Bobiev and Eshref Trushin for valuable references and 
background information.  All errors and misinterpretations, however, remain our own, and the comments 
herein reflect policy neither of the Government of Kazakhstan nor of the United States of America.  
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PENSION REFORM IN CENTRAL ASIA: AN OVERVIEW 
 
Thirteen years ago, Central Asia’s new nations had just emerged from seven decades of 
Soviet power. To varying degrees, all were unprepared for Independence. Each faced its own 
opportunities and constraints; the ruling groups in each country had differing perspectives on the 
manner in which economic transformation would take place, on the extent to which 
democratization and pluralism would be introduced, and the extent to which their country would 
embrace openness and globalization. This diversity of approaches extended to social policy, and 
in particular to social security and pension reforms. The heterogeneous response is the topic of 
this paper. We explore the extent to which the varying measures reflected differences in 
underlying pressures and in capacities to undertake reforms: it will come as no surprise that we 
conclude environment was important in determining response. 
 
At the same time, we argue that the diversity of social policy reforms owes much to 
different objectives of various rulers and policymakers. While unmodified maintenance of Soviet 
welfare state practices was untenable, especially during the years of rapid decline throughout 
much of the 1990s, the wide range of responses reflected broader differences in economic policy 
and engagement of the world. To a large degree as well, the policies embraced or avoided 
embodied policymakers’ responsiveness to external pressures from bilateral donors and 
international organizations, many of which sought to experiment with social policy reforms in 
what might be termed virgin lands. 
 
As we see below, on paper the social security systems of Central Asia are diverging, and 
may well diverge still more in the coming years. In reality, though, the differences in formal 
policies may overstate effective differences, with the main distinctions in practice being driven by 
government capacity. These differences in capacity are discussed in the following section, as is 
the underlying need for reform, as indicated by differences in demography and economic growth. 
Section 2 then examines the Soviet pension system, as it served as the starting point for each 
country examined, and also briefly surveys common reform options. Sections 3 through 6 then 
discuss each country individually, starting with Kazakhstan’s dramatic move to an individual 
account system, and following with a discussion of Kyrgyzstan’s rather stillborn move to a 
notional defined contribution system. Uzbekistan’s resistance to pension reform and belated  
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embrasure are described in Section 5, after which we turn to the impending reforms in 
Tajikistan.
1  It is difficult to read these sections without sensing the rush now underway. We 
conclude by examining whether the sense of hurry is objectively merited, or whether it reflects a 
pressured reaction to encouragement from international bodies, and a fear of being left behind. 
 
Before turning to descriptions of the “objective” setting and of individual countries, 
three key points warrant comment. First, by any standard, public provision of pensions and 
various social allowances in Central Asia is very generous relative to expenditures in non-socialist 
countries at similar levels of PPP per capita income. As public sector, recurrent expenditures 
must be funded by incentive-distorting taxes or the inflationary printing of money, competition 
with countries at similar economic levels has placed pressure on governments throughout the 
region to reduce welfare commitments. This pressure was especially strong during periods of 
economic decline and shrinking tax revenues; it has lessened in Kazakhstan as exceptional 
economic recovery has taken place. On the whole, though, one would expect pressure to reduce 
public sector commitments, and this in fact has been observed. 
 
Second, reinforcing this effect has been strong external encouragement to undertake 
reforms, especially from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID). The different objectives of these and other 
bodies are described in Becker and Paltsev (2001). Briefly, following publication of the influential 
“James Report” (World Bank, 1994), the World Bank enthusiastically promoted the adoption of 
“multi-pillar” social security reforms throughout the developing world. In this scheme, some sort 
of basic social payment was to comprise the first, public pillar (usually envisioned as a defined 
benefit [DB], unfunded or “PAYGO” system). The second pillar consisted of a mandatory 
individual defined contribution (DC) system, usually privately operated, but possibly publicly 
operated and simply used to buy current government debt, thereby making it a “notional” 
defined contribution (NDC) system of individual accounts but PAYGO funding. Rather 
fancifully, the James Report also envisioned the creation of a third, voluntary private pension 
account pillar. Subsequent pension reform technical assistance (PRTA) and pension reform 
implementation loan (PRIL) projects would include this mirage as a prospective pillar, but a 
genuine third pillar has not yet been sighted in Central Asia. 
 
                                                           
1 Turkmenistan is not discussed, as to our knowledge no reforms have been undertaken, and pension reform is not a 
major theme of President Niyazov’s Rukhnama.  
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The World Bank’s multi-pillar approach was paralleled by ADB’s and USAID’s advocacy 
of private, DC systems. In Kazakhstan, these approaches coincided, and all external 
organizations promoted the development of a private, DC pillar (though some at the World 
Bank appear to have since backtracked). In Kyrgyzstan, the approaches conflicted: ADB hoped 
that development of a private DC system would both replace the first DB pillar and kick-start 
development of a private financial sector, while the World Bank pushed for a NDC reform. As 
events transpired, neither development bank would have its dreams realized in Kyrgyzstan, while 
lack of public capacity in Tajikistan and determined resistance to reform in Uzbekistan frustrated 
their efforts there as well. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) throughout the period has 
played the role of an interested and nervous party: the Fund is concerned that major reforms will 
place severe burdens on already weak current public finances, and therefore tends to favor 
simple pillar one PAYGO reforms. 
 
Finally, as Seitenova and Becker (2004) note, the first steps to reform the Soviet pension 
system actually were taken before the USSR’s collapse. In response to economic problems, in the 
late 1980s, the Soviet Government enacted the following pension legislation: 
•  Introduction of the law “On state pensions in the USSR” (April 28, 1990) 
•  Introduction of the law “On pension provision in the USSR” (May 15, 1990) 
•  Formation of the Pension Fund of the USSR (August 15, 1990). 
In connection with these measures, republican divisions of the USSR Pension Fund were 
established in all Central Asian states just prior to their independence. In consequence, in each of 
these newly independent countries, their own, national Pension Funds naturally evolved from 
the recently created USSR Republican funds. Each of these Pension Funds initially were 
governed by the laws adopted from the Soviet 1990 law on pension provision. The length of 
time during which Soviet pension laws were used as a given country’s pension system regulatory 
framework, and hence how long uniform Pension Funds operated throughout Central Asia, 
depended mainly on the complexity of problems of financing the pension system. These 
problems, in turn, most forcefully appeared in those countries in which the emerging private 
sector was able to evade taxes.  
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I.  THE BACKGROUND: FISCAL CONDITIONS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
STRUCTURE. 
 
I.1. Demographic  Position 
 
The overall demographic situation in Central Asian countries was and remains favorable 
for traditional, pay-as-you-go (PAYGO), defined benefit social security systems. By international 
standards, all countries have fairly low old-age dependency ratios (Table 1). The main causes of 
that are the traditionally high fertility rates in Muslim nations, along with adult/child mortality 
rate ratios that are unusually high by international standards. The highest dependency ratio (0.11) 
is observed in Kazakhstan, and reflects a high population share non-Kazakhs (mostly Russians), 
who are characterized by higher mortality and lower fertility. However, even Kazakhstan’s 
dependency ratio is much below the critical levels of 0.2 and higher observed in developed 
countries. 
 
Table 1. Old-Age Support and Dependency Ratios
2 
 Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan  Kazakhstan
   1989 2002 1989 2003 1989 2003 1989 2003
Share of age groups in total population,%:                          
0-14  41 36 37 33 43  40 32.3 25.7
15-64  55 60 58 62 53 56 62 67
65+  4 4 5 5 4  4 5.7 7.3
Old-Age Support Ratio (Population at age 15-64 / 
Population at age 65+)  13.8 15.0 11.6 12.4 13.3 14.0 10.9 9.18
Old-Age Dependency  Ratio (Population at age 65+ / 
Population at age 15-64)  0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.11
 
Population pyramids for the four countries are shown in Figure 1. These are largely self-
explanatory, and quite affirmative of the favorable age structure of populations. Only in 
Kazakhstan do elderly cohorts comprise a significant share of the population. However, this 
optimistic picture is somewhat misleading from the perspective of pension policy, since 
premature retirement is significant, and grew rapidly in the early independence years (Becker and 
Urzhumova, 1998; Seitenova and Becker, 2004). 
 
                                                           
2 The old-age dependency dependency ratio reported understates the actual dependency ratio, since retirement age is 
below 65, and because there are also many early retirees. 
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Figure 1.  Central Asian Population Pyramids 
Uzbekistan, 1998
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Figure 2 shows long run total fertility rate (TFR) trends for each of the five Central 
Asian republics. Prior to independence, differences in TFRs reflected overall levels of economic 
development and ethnic composition, but there were few sharp movements. A sharp decline in 
fertility followed independence in all countries. These declines have no short-term impact on the 
social security system, but will have a long-term effect starting around year 2015, when the 
smaller generation born after 1991 will enter labor markets and, at the same time, the generation 
of baby boomers (people born in 1946-1965) will start retiring.  
 
  
Along with declining fertility came a sharp increase in mortality, observed in all countries 
from 1991 through 1995.
3  This mortality rise will have significant short-term effects on the 
social security systems.
  On the expenditure side, the rise implies an increase in the number of 
survivorship beneficiaries and a decrease in the number of old age retirees; and on the revenue 
side, increased mortality must have resulted in a decrease in the number of social taxpayers. This 
latter effect, however, would have been unimportant, since the collapse of formal sector 
                                                           
3 Unfortunately, only Kazakhstan discloses age-specific mortality rates in regular statistical reports, leaving one to 
compare crude death rates (CDRs) or highly inaccurate estimates of life expectancy at birth. The comparison of 
crude death rates is somewhat deceptive given different age structures of populations in the four countries (see 
population pyramids above). The best public data set, to our knowledge, is available at www.demoscope.ru.  
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employment and emergence of widespread unemployment rendered supply constraints non-
binding. Thus, the net effect of increased mortality should have been to reduce social security 
pressures – but quite modestly relative to the other shocks taking place.  
 
  Official CDR data show mortality improvement in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which 
seems implausible given the economic crises (along with a low-grade civil war in Tajikistan) and 
the overall deterioration of health care in Central Asian countries. The likeliest explanation for 
these counterintuitive trends is deterioration of data collection practices, resulting in 
underreporting of deaths. This is especially true in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where central 
governments lost control of many remote and rural areas. Another possible explanation is 
underreporting of deaths for political reasons. Thus, all data other than from Kazakhstan and 
northern Kyrgyzstan must be treated with considerable caution.
4 
 
The substantial negative net migration observed in all Central Asian countries in the 
1990s resulted in decreasing numbers of both retirees and people at working age. It is difficult to 
make any assertions about the short-term impact of large-scale emigration on the social security 
system, since only emigration of formal sector employees affected revenues (emigration of 
unemployed people seeking jobs abroad would not have any impact on revenues). However, we 
do know that emigration rates have been unusually stable across age and gender groups (for 
example, Becker and Paltsev, 2004; Becker et al., 2005), so that there would have been little 
impact on the population distribution. However, it is almost certain that many elderly 
“European” citizens from the poorer Central Asian republics would have left to claim pensions 
in relatively more prosperous parts of the former USSR, thereby diminishing local pension 
burdens. Moreover, in collapsed economies such as Tajikistan, emigration of both refugees and 
labor migrants (who sent back remittances) have played an important role in compensating for 
the state’s loss of capacity. 
 
The long-term effect of the demographic changes must be negative as mortality is 
expected to recover (in Kazakhstan, mortality significantly improved over the period from 1995 
through 1999 and stabilized in the recent years: see Becker and Urzhumova, 2005). At the same 
time, while fertility recovery is underway now that economic stabilization and recovery is taking 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
4 For discussions of underreporting issues dating to the Soviet era, see Anderson and Silver (1997); for a discussion 
of underreporting in Kyrgyzstan, see Becker et al. (1998). 
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place, it seems most unlikely to return to the high levels observed in the Soviet era. Ultimately, 
the demographic situation in Central Asian countries must converge to that in the developed 
countries with high dependency ratios (0.2 or higher). The pace of this convergence will depend 
on the pace and scope of economic recovery.  
 
Because the most reliable and detailed data are for Kazakhstan, these patterns are most 
clearly observed in that country. Even though its economic situation has improved dramatically 
in the past five years, Kazakhstan’s demographic improvements have not been correspondingly 
great. While TFRs have recovered to population maintenance level, mortality rates have not 
recovered to pre-crisis levels. In fact there was slight increase in urban mortality at working ages 
from 1999 to 2003. This happened in part because the economic growth of the recent years 
occurred mostly due to the growth of harmful productions such as oil and gas, mining and 
construction industries. Continued high rates of accidental death outside the workplace also have 
been critical in sustaining very high adult mortality rates (Becker and Urzhumova, 2005). In 
addition, given the poor condition of health care in Kazakhstan (preventive and emergency care, 
in particular), gains in child and elderly mortality also have been slow, although infectious disease 
mortality has declined markedly. Without significant investment in health care (including health 
care restructuring) and without significant structural changes in the economy, mortality will not 
improve to the levels observed in developed countries. This statement almost surely holds true 
for the other Central Asian republics as well, as all are far poorer than Kazakhstan. 
 
Therefore, population dependency ratios in Central Asian countries may remain 
significantly below the critical level (0.25) for a long period of time. For example, demographic 
projections made by Seitenova and Urzhumova (2003) show that the population dependency 
ratio in Kazakhstan will grow to 0.25 only by 2040 if life expectancy at birth improves from 60.3 
in 2001 to 65 in 2015 and to 73 in 2050 for males, and from 71 in 2001 to 75 in 2025 and to 81 
in 2050 for females, and with TFR recovering from 1.8 in 2001 to 2.05 in 2025 and then to 2.08 
in 2050. Given that fertility has already recovered to 2.0 in 2003, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the dependency ratio in Kazakhstan will reach critical level later rather than before 2040. In other 
Central Asian countries the demographic situation is more favorable, given higher fertility and 
lower mortality rates  -- though, as emphasized above, the quality of demographic statistics in 
these countries is poorer than Kazakhstani data, which means that mortality in these countries 
may be underreported.  
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I.2. Economic  Changes 
 
Economic crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union – i.e., closure of a large number of 
enterprises, growing unemployment, and emergence of shadow labor markets – characterized the 
entire region. Table 2 shows changes in the structure of employment in four Central Asian 
countries over the period from 1992 to 2003. By 2003, the formal sector of the economy (i.e., 
employment at tax compliant enterprises) decreased from about 100% of employment prior to 
1990 to 75% of employment in Uzbekistan, about 60% of employment in Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan, and to less than 40% of employment in Kyrgyzstan. Tax evasion became a common 
practice among the growing numbers of self-employed who had small volumes of business and, 
therefore, could conduct direct buyer/seller transactions in cash without bank involvement, 
thereby making their revenues non-transparent to tax authorities
5. In Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan, hired labor includes workers employed under labor contracts at large, medium-
size and small enterprises, as well as workers hired by individual entrepreneurs. Based on 
Kazakhstan’s (better-documented) tax compliance situation, it is reasonable to conclude that 
only a limited part of hired labor in these countries represents tax-compliant employment. The 
figures given for Kazakhstan represent the number of employed at large and medium-size 
enterprises, i.e., the fully tax compliant sector. 
Table 2.  Structure of Labor Resources 
(all figures are in thousands unless otherwise stated) 
 Uzbekistan  Kyrgyzstan  Tajikistan  Kazakhstan   
1992 1999  1992  2003  1992 2003 1992 1997  2003 
Labor Resources (able-
bodied population) 
10,413  12,297  2,264  2,915  2,668.8  3,644  9,355.3  8,813.6  10,936.0
Economically active 
population 
8,291  8,924  1,837  2,011  1,912.9  1,931.3  7,577.8  7,440.1  7,657.3
as % of Labor resources  80.0  73.0  81.1  69.0  71.7  53.0  81.0  84.4  70.0 
Employed Population  8,272  8,885  1,836  1,824  1,908.9  1,885.0  7,210.2  6,472.3  6,985.2
as % of  Economically 
active population       
99.8  99.6  100.0  90.7  99.8  97.6  95.1  87.0  91.2 
including:                   
Hired Labor   6,824  6,637  1,521  720.0  1,508.1  1,072.0  6,842.6  3,862.7  4,229.6
as % of  Employed 
Population 
 82.5   74.7  82.9  39.5  79.0  56.9  94.9  59.7  60.6 
Self-Employed    1,448   2,248  314.7  1,104  400.8  813.0  367.6  2,609.6  2,755.6
as % of  Employed 
Population 
 17.5   25.3  17  61  21.0  43.1  5.1  40.3  39.4 
 
 
                                                           
5 In Kazakhstan, another category of tax evaders consists of small enterprises that also take the advantage of cash-
based transactions to underreport revenues and wages paid to employees. Therefore, this category may be termed 
semi-compliant.   
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Table 3. Effective Support and Dependency Ratios 
(all figures are in thousands unless otherwise stated) 
 Uzbekistan  Tajikistan  Kyrgyzstan  Kazakhstan   
1992 1999 1992 2003 1992 2003 1992 1997 2003 
Number of formal sector 
employees (Hired Labor) *  6,824 
 
6,637  1,508.1  1,072  1,521.2  720  6,305  3,665.7  4,229 
Number of Pensioners & 
Social Allowance Recipients, 
at the beginning of year 
2,499  3,054  572  534  621  593  2591  2,720.7  2,394 
Effective Dependency Ratio 
(the number of formal sector 
employees relative to the 
number of Beneficiaries) 
0.37  0.46  0.38  0.50  0.41  0.82  0.41  0.74  0.57 
* Number of Hired Labor for all countries, except Kazakhstan. For Kazakhstan, the numbers represent employment at large and 
medium-size enterprises i.e. the fully compliant segment. 
 
Lower estimates of effective dependency ratios for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, as well as the actual effective dependency ratios for Kazakhstan are given in Table 3. 
The shrinkage of formal labor markets resulted in a slump in real social fund revenues and the 
financial viability of social security systems in all Central Asian countries. The increases in 
effective dependency ratios are largest in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, but in the latter case, this 
is somewhat offset by larger payments from the actually contributing population. 
 
On the expenditure side, growing unemployment caused an increase in the number of 
applicants for disability benefits with moderate disability (Seitenova and Becker, 2004). Under 
more favorable labor market conditions, these people would have stayed in the labor market and 
would not apply for the benefits. In addition, there were numerous disability benefit abuses (i.e., 
false assignment of moderate disability to healthy lives induced by bribes). 
 
As is well known, economic collapse did follow the political dissolution of the USSR, 
while the late Soviet period was characterized by stagnation. This decline extended to Central 
Asia as well, making it impossible to sustain the comprehensive Soviet welfare state. Between 
1991 and 1995, real GDP declined by 18% in Uzbekistan, 31% in Kazakhstan, 45% in 
Kyrgyzstan, and 59% in Tajikistan (www.cisstat.com). Considerable recovery has occurred since 
then (Figure 3), by which point Kazakhstan’s exceeded the 1991 level by 6% and, should one 
choose to believe the numbers, Uzbekistan’s GDP was 12% greater in real terms. On the other 
hand, Kyrgyzstan’s GDP remained 19% lower in 2003 than in 1991, while Tajikistan’s GDP was 
46% less. 
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As real GDP declined, declines in social welfare payments were inevitable. Not only was 
overall GDP shrinking, public sector command over resources, and hence its ability to make 
transfers, declined further. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, government consumption as a share of 
GDP declined from 25.0% in 1990 to 17.9% in 1998 (ADB, 2003). Yawning public deficits 
emerged; since large international borrowing was infeasible, plummeting tax collections enforced 
public sector shrinkage. Even in resource-rich Kazakhstan, public consumption fell from 12.0% 
of GDP in 1990 to 10.8% in 1998, which also witnessed a public budget deficit of 8.0% of GDP. 
Base data are not available for Tajikistan, but in 1998 government consumption only accounted 
for 4.2% of GDP. Although total public expenditures were 14.2% of GDP, less than 2% of total 
expenditures (and hence less than 1/3 of 1% of GDP) were spent on social welfare. 
 
  In light of this diminished capacity, it is not surprising to find that real pension values 
were very low (Figure 4), as was the ratio of average pension to average wage (the so-called 
“replacement rate” shown in Figure 5). With economic recovery, pension payments have risen, 
but only in Kazakhstan are they substantial. Kazakhstan allowed its replacement rates to 
deteriorate as economic recovery took place, and only raised pensions substantially when it 
became clear that the nation had regained its previous peak GDP levels. In contrast, replacement  
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rates in Kyrgyzstan have continued to dwindle slowly, while there has been no clear trend in 
Tajikistan. For the region as a whole, with the exception of Uzbekistan, replacement rates are 
currently about 30% -- implying tiny payments in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
 
II.  INITIAL CONDITIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS 
Before examining each country in some detail, it is important to present background 
information to provide a sense of the setting, and also to discuss the range of reform options 
being considered. As distinct from low and middle-income countries outside the former USSR 
and Eastern Europe, Central Asia’s republics enjoyed a comprehensive social welfare system as 
part of the USSR. This well-established system was not only socially popular, it was seen in effect 
as a birthright, thereby creating enormous pressure on today’s leaders to maintain substantial 
universal coverage. 
 
Briefly, the pension systems in Central Asian countries as of 1991 contained the 
following features inherited from the Soviet social security system. For those retiring on regular 
old-age terms, the normal retirement age was 60 years for males and 55 years for females. In 
order to receive full benefits, the complete service requirement was 25 years of service for males, 
and 20 years for females. This duration is quite liberal relative to the years that will be required in 
order to earn comparable rates under the various accumulative reforms, especially as the notion 
of service itself was quite liberal (including, for example, years spent in university study, maternal 
leave, and years out-of-work for spouses of Soviet workers abroad). The benefit formula was 
simple and generous. Full service retirees received 55-60% of final wage at retirement for 
complete service plus 1% of final wage for each year of work over complete service, with the 
maximum benefit equal to 75-85% of final wage, and with a rather generous cap imposed on 
final wage. Retirees with incomplete service years received pro-rated benefits. Retirees with no 
history of employment received old-age social allowances. The Social Security System also 
provided survivorship and disability benefits calculated based on the final breadwinner’s or newly 
disabled worker’s wage. This system has tended to create the idea of 55-60% of individual wage 
as a benchmark replacement rate, though one would expect this rate on average to be somewhat 
below 55-60% because of the wage cap for pension calculation and retirees with incomplete 
service years (and, therefore, pro-rated pensions).
6  
                                                           
6  Comparison with the average replacement rates in the preceding section is inexact. Note first that the rates 
reported in Section 1 include years well after 1991 when pensions were already affected by incomplete adjustment to 
inflation, distortions caused by new currencies, and benefit reductions. Moreover, there is a difference between RR 
to the average nationwide wage and to the individual final wage. In addition to caps, the national averages include  
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Beyond standard retirement conditions, many people were eligible to retire on favorable 
terms (льготные условия). This included a substantial number eligible to retire at early age for 
certain occupations, some of whom (such as workers at mining, construction and chemical 
industries) were in obviously more dangerous occupations, some of whom worked in ostensibly 
more dangerous conditions (regions qualified as environmentally disastrous) and some of whom 
were low-qualified manual laborers (such as a broad variety of agricultural workers). Early 
retirement age varied from 45/50 to 50/55 for females/males depending on the occupation; in 
certain occupations, the pension benefit paid within the period from early to regular retirement 
age was lower than the full benefit. In addition, the old pension system allowed workers at 
certain occupations for whom skills deteriorated quickly (e.g., ballerinas and pilots) to retire at any 
age once they fulfill the complete service requirement (i.e., 20/25 years for females/males). The 
same favor was granted to some categories of workers for whom there was no obvious reason 
(notably, school teachers and some categories of medical personnel). The system further 
contained service multipliers above 1.0 for each year of service in certain geographic regions or 
in certain occupations or in certain periods of time (such as war time), and benefit multipliers 
above 1.0 for certain categories of retirees.  
 
In sum the old Soviet system provided generous benefits on favorable terms to a large 
proportion of retirees. In Kazakhstan, for example, in 1991 the number of retirees on favorable 
terms made up 20% of all old-age pensioners. For certain harmful occupations, the benefits were 
excessive in that workers had already received reasonable compensation for occupational risks in 
the form of higher wages, and, therefore, favorable terms of retirement resulted in 
overcompensation. However, the system was sustainable due to high employment and high adult 
mortality (which reduced the numbers who would receive social benefits). Social tax compliance 
was also essentially universal, though this point should be qualified: those working in agricultural 
cooperatives or state farms made very limited contributions – though they also received fairly 
modest payments. 
 
The Soviet social security system had the advantages of generous benefits and 
sustainability. From the standpoint of the newly independent successor states, however, there 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
people with incomplete service years. Wage growth also affects replacement rates. Rates are higher for the newly 
retired, because pensions are computed based on recent wages, than for the stock of retirees, which is the average 
reported in Section 1. 
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were several problems. The most severe was that the system’s generosity could not be 
maintained in the face of collapsing employment, wages, and social tax compliance. Worse, 
declining resources in the early 1990s were paralleled by surging numbers of premature 
retirements (documented for Kazakhstan by Becker and Urzhumova, 1998, and Seitenova and 
Becker, 2004).  
 
Generosity of the system was exacerbated by a lack of proper control systems – i.e., no 
recordkeeping for contributions, and no nation-wide computer databases with individual records 
for retirees and beneficiaries. For example, in Kazakhstan individual recordkeeping for 
beneficiaries was a responsibility of local social security offices while birth, death and migration 
registration was a duty of local statistical offices. There was no verification of the two databases 
against each other, resulting in numerous abuses of the social security system by both 
beneficiaries and social security officers (misreporting of age by pension applicants resulted in 
premature benefits, unregistered emigrants continued to receive pensions, and social security 
officers appropriated pensions for the “dead souls;” i.e., for the people who died but whose 
deaths were not properly recorded by local social security offices in order to over-report the 
amounts to be paid to locally registered beneficiaries). In addition, there was no control over 
individual social tax contributions. Years of service were verified based purely on labor books 
that contained individual records of employment. With a growing number of small private 
enterprises that had very short business lives, it became easier to falsify records as verification of 
the records made by an enterprise shut down by the time of retirement was impossible. 
  
All these factors resulted in a significant increase in government expenditures, and a 
slump in social fund revenues. As obligations outstripped capacity, local Social Fund authorities 
made payments that were late, and often in-kind (typically flour, but on occasion other foods or 
vodka), especially in rural areas. By the mid-1990s, one of the most pressing issues in Kyrgyzstan 
was the elimination of in-kind payments, but we believe that such payments took place 
throughout Central Asia. 
 
As authorities realized the extent of the problem, they took efforts to reduce 
inappropriate early retirements, consolidated Social Fund operations, and worked to reduce 
arrears. It became quite obvious that the terms and parameters of social security systems had to 
be revised to cope with the current budget deficits. The measures taken within the framework of 
the “Solidarity” PAYGO defined-benefit system can be summarized in the following five  
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categories. All of the measures listed, except for the multi-pillar arrangements, can take place 
within a conventional PAYGO system, as they simply involve changes in parameters and terms 
of system rules, plus control over tax history and benefits. 
 
The most obvious step is a revision (reduction) of benefits. This is especially easy 
during periods of high inflation, since the Government does not have to reduce nominal 
payments – it simply does not fully adjust for inflation. In Central Asia, not only was there high 
to hyperinflation during the early post-Soviet period, currencies also were changed (and 
sometimes more than once, as Uzbekistan introduced a scrip temporary currency before 
establishing the som as the successor to the Soviet ruble). Real values of wages earned during the 
Soviet era plummeted, and so Solidarity pension payments quickly converged to minimum 
amounts, adjusted upward for some on the basis of recognized multipliers. The impact of the 
inflation and delayed indexation was to reduce average replacement rates markedly, and also to 
reduce the variance of pension payments. Put differently, replacement rates fell especially 
strongly for upper income, urban groups. In Kazakhstan, an additional measure to reduce 
benefits was the introduction of a low wage cap for the calculation of pension benefits that 
resulted in low replacement rates for newly retired. In the past couple of years, Kazakhstan has 
taken steps to link Solidarity pension payments to the real value of Soviet era wages while 
keeping the low wage cap. This measure improved pensions of those who retired years ago and 
whose pensions decayed over time as wages grew in real terms, but the replacement rates (to the 
average nationwide wage) of new retirees remained as low as 30%. To our knowledge, other 
countries in the region, which lack large mineral revenues, have not done so. 
 
In addition to reduced benefits, many countries have taken steps to curb the extent of 
favorable term retirement, by raising eligibility requirements and reducing categories. The level 
of additional benefits also has been cut in some cases. 
 
  A third measure taken by several Central Asian republics has been to increase social tax 
rates. These rates have been the subject of frequent modification throughout the region, and we 
do not seek to quantify them all. Rather, we simply note the possibility of doing so, and mention 
that rate increases have been common. While raising social tax rates is in principle a simple 
solution, it invites evasion, and of course puts the formal sector at a competitive disadvantage 
with the lightly taxed informal sector. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, individual entrepreneurs 
and small businessmen face relatively light social tax rates, and are likely to evade even these.  
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This evasion was a problem especially in the 1990s, but even today, full compliance is a huge 
problem. Defining the “formal sector” to mean that part of the economy whose employers or 
employees make regular and substantial social contributions (thereby excluding agriculture, from 
which payments are tiny), 2001 data from Kazakhstan indicate that only 42% of the employed 
labor force fits into this category. The proportions are surely far lower in other Central Asian 
countries, and less as well if we limit attention to the private sector. Raising taxes further is 
therefore costly, especially in those countries where the base rate is high. Thus, raising social tax 
rates had to be a short-term measure to balance social security funds, as it conflicted with the 
long-term goals to reduce unemployment and promote formal sector development that would 
provide for a long-run sustainability of social security systems.  
 
  A fourth, extremely unpopular measure is to raise the statutory retirement age. The 
World Bank has emphasized this reform, as to a lesser extent have other international bodies. 
The increase is an obvious measure, especially as it has an immediate impact. A typical reform in 
developing and middle-income countries is to raise retirement by three to five years, usually in 
increments of four to six months per year. Thus, the reform will tend to reduce the number of 
new retirees by one-third to one-half for a period of six to 15 years. In effect, this is an extreme 
example of benefit reduction – the “young elderly” are simply removed from eligibility. The 
measures have met with widespread opposition, especially in countries with pluralistic political 
systems, such as Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan.
7 There are many votes in opposing such reforms, 
and even the non-elderly tend to have an emotional reaction to efforts to remove benefits to 
those of (Soviet-era) pension age. In large Central Asian cities, especially during the 1990s, many 
among the elderly population were visibly poor (for example, engaging in scavenging activity), 
and this might have contributed to the belief that the elderly are the poorest social group. 
Evidence based on household surveys strongly suggests otherwise (as detailed in Anderson and 
Pomfret, 2003), and points to youth poverty and malnutrition as being a more serious problem, 
but there is no doubt that a crude move to cut the number of pensioners is seen as drastic. An 
obvious reason for this is that so few of the nearly-retired enjoy productive employment. In the 
former Soviet countries this was exacerbated by the economic crises and growing unemployment. 
State enterprises, which were non-competitive in the new market environment, closed or put 
                                                           
7 To anticipate our argument in the following section, the different choices made by Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
had two underlying causes. First, the smaller, poorer, and less diverse Kyrgyz economy had fewer options. Second, 
while Kazakhstan is pluralistic, President Nazarbayev is the pre-eminent political figure, and when his decisions 
serve as a virtual order to the Majilis (Parliament) if he decides to press them. In contrast, President Akaev is much 
weaker politically in Kyrgyzstan, and faces more determined opposition, so that he probably could not have 
completely dictated to the Zhegorku Kenesh (Parliament) on the issue of pension reform.  
Becker, Seitenova, & Urzhumova 
Pension reform in Kazakhstan and Central Asia: an overview 
Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research workshop on pension reform in transition economies 
1 April 2005 
19
 
many workers on extended furloughs. Large numbers of laid-off workers needed to undergo 
market-oriented re-training to obtain jobs in private businesses. Obviously, people at ages close 
to the statutory retirement age could not compete with younger people in the job market. Raising 
retirement age therefore was not merely an issue of prolonging working careers, but rather for 
most people close to retirement age it meant further delay to the time when a cash income again 
would be received. Another factor that limited appropriateness of retirement age increases in 
Central Asian countries was the overall low technological development in both industrial and 
agricultural sectors and, therefore, an emphasis on manual labor – which again places elderly 
workers at a distinct disadvantage. In addition, while in developed countries, retirement age 
increases are justified by the increasing life expectancy and, therefore, longer productive lives, 
this argument cannot be applied to justify such measure in Central Asian countries given high 
elderly mortality and morbidity.  
 
  More radical and expensive solutions require the establishment of substantial 
information infrastructure, either to reduce overpayments in the Solidarity system, or to 
prepare for a “multi-pillar” system. An important reform is to set up proper nationwide 
control systems, with individual recordkeeping for both taxpayers and beneficiaries. 
Even though this component is important for an effective social security system, the cost of 
establishing and maintaining such systems in the former Soviet Union was not justified by the 
efficiency gains, as the whole economy consisted of state enterprises and tax compliant labor 
market made up nearly 100% of employment. For the majority of retirees there was no need to 
abuse benefits due to the stability and certainty of jobs. Even if falsifications of work or wage 
history took place, they were not pervasive. Therefore, cost savings would be small as compared 
to the cost of the information systems.  
 
In the changed economic and labor market environments in Central Asian countries, 
individual recordkeeping for both taxpayers and beneficiaries became crucial. However, the 
governments did not have financial resources to establish computer-based information systems 
given overall budget deficits. Such systems were established only in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
as part of more drastic reforms (i.e., establishment of a funded DC system in Kazakhstan and a 
notional accounts system in Kyrgyzstan). The governments could cover the respective costs due 
to the grants and loans provided by international donors (mainly the World Bank in both 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, though the ADB and USAID assisted as well). Both countries 
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devoted considerable resources to establishing a national personal identification number (PIN) 
number and individual accounts. Doing so is anything but easy, as experience in both countries 
has shown – duplicate numbers for the same person are common, and the underlying 
information system database is sophisticated and expensive. Kazakhstan introduced individual 
recordkeeping system only for contributions to private pension funds and for benefit payments. 
Social tax payments are still made by enterprises in the form of a total amount due, with no 
individual breakdown.  
 
  Once a database capable of tracking individuals is established, a country can then 
consider more radical reforms. The set of options that exist in principle is outlined in Figure 6.
8 
One can have public or private management of a welfare system; the system can be unfunded 
(PAYGO), partially funded, or fully funded; and payments can be defined benefit or defined 
contribution. In practice, most countries maintain a public, unfunded, DB system (of which the 
Solidarity systems are an example), and then consider adding one or two supportive pillars. 
Private, voluntary pension systems comprise a “third pillar,” and are popular among transition 
countries’ governments. In the Central Asian context, voluntary, private, funded, DC 
arrangements are virtually meaningless, since there is little demand for them. 
 
  This leaves the option of a second, mandatory pillar to supplement the Solidarity system. 
In principle, such a mandatory, (presumably but not necessarily) private, funded, DC 
“Accumulative” system could supplant the public first pillar, and this is the stated intention in 
Kazakhstan. In practice, however, the public Solidarity system seems unlikely to vanish there or 
elsewhere, barring dramatic economic collapse. 
 
                                                           
8 In practice, private firms do not run PAYGO systems, at least not overtly. However, at least in the United States, 
many firms’ pension funds are not fully funded, and, even when officially fully funded it is common for firms to 
hold a disproportionate share of pension fund assets in own company stock – making it something of a covert 
PAYGO scheme. Obviously, actuaries do not recommend such schemes, and they are distinguished in the Figure 6 
by highlighting. 
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Figure 6.  Organization and development of pension systems 
 
Organization   Funding    Payment  scheme 
 
 
   PAYGO    Defined  benefit 
        
       Defined  contribution  (notional) 
 
Public 
(state)   Fully  funded  Defined  benefit 
 
       Defined  contribution 
 
 
Private   PAYGO    Defined  benefit   
(individual or 
employer)       Defined  contribution  (notional) 
 
 
   Fully  funded  Defined  benefit 
 
       Defined  contribution 
  
 
The ultimate objectives of Accumulative systems include reducing public pension 
obligations and raising national savings rates. It is not obvious that an Accumulative system 
rather than extensive PAYGO reforms is the best way to address budgetary shortfalls: the 
shortfall reduction with an Accumulative reform is achieved by concomitant abandonment of 
prior PAYGO system commitments. By definition, the Accumulative system has nothing to do 
with budget deficits, as it cannot reduce current government obligations accumulated in the past. 
 
However, Accumulative system goals should also seek to ensure adequate pensions (or 
supplemental pensions), rather than simply reducing PAYGO shortfalls. Logically, it is easiest 
conceptually for PAYGO by itself to balance revenues/expenditures through tax rates and 
benefit parameters and definitions. If the PAYGO system is financially sound, then the decision 
on whether to expend to a multi-pillar system is to raise mandatory or voluntary personal savings, 
in the event that a balanced PAYGO system with reasonable (and optimal for the economy)  
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payroll taxes cannot provide higher-than-basic pension incomes to regular contributors (i.e., 
aging population problem). Moreover, such a combination diversifies risks, especially if the 
system permits holding of foreign assets (as Kazakhstan’s does: pension funds are allowed an 
international assert share of up to 25% of total assets). If a person retires during economic crisis, 
her PAYGO pension would be low, as the government would not be able to pay high pensions. 
At the same time, the accumulations would have been made over a long period of time, 
including periods with high economic growth. The opposite is also true. If a person retires in the 
period of high economic growth, PAYGO pensions may be high, while accumulations might 
have been accumulated in bad times, and, therefore, funded pensions would be low.  
 
Indeed, the move to a second pillar creates short-term financing problems, since 
contributions to individual accounts are generally enabled by reduced payroll contribution rates 
to the Solidarity system, while that system’s obligations are not reduced for some time. This 
short-term deficit is at the heart of the IMF’s nervousness about second pillar systems. Ironically, 
though, the short-term deficit issue also was a key issue in selling the Accumulative reforms, as 
by adopting this system, international financial institution loans (especially from the World Bank) 
were forthcoming.  Of course, this too represented a gamble, since, had oil prices remained at 
mid-1990s levels for an extended period, the loans would have been difficult to repay. 
 
Nor is it obvious, at least to a macroeconomist, why a small, open economy should want 
to raise its savings rate. The largest Central Asian economy, Kazakhstan, had a 2004 GDP of 
about USD 35 billion; Uzbekistan, the second largest economy, has a dollar GDP less than half 
that amount. Potential international capital flows will dwarf the additional net savings (which are, 
after all, net of added government dissavings) that will occur. This perspective is somewhat 
myopic, though, in that creating a large class of private asset-owning citizens implies the 
emergence of a group interested in safeguarding assets. That is, an Accumulative pension reform 
means creating a domestic lobby whose interests generally coincide with that of prospective 
foreign investors, and creating a set of enabling laws that safeguard property. Together, these 
forces may well “crowd in” foreign capital. 
 
The role of a new Accumulative system in jump-starting financial sector development is 
difficult to assess empirically. Kazakhstan’s experience is certainly consistent with the theory that 
an Accumulative system can play an important role, though it is critical to emphasize that 
Kazakhstan enjoyed many necessary conditions lacking elsewhere. While formal proof is lacking,  
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we find it difficult to envision what else could have played so critical a role (see Seitenova and 
Becker, 2004, for details). This jump-start model has been eagerly espoused both by the US 
Agency for International Development and Kazakhstan’s National Bank.  
 
The major downside of the Accumulative model is that it promises to greatly increase 
inequality among the pension population (Seitenova and Urzhumova, 2003). This is especially 
true if a strong Solidarity system does not remain in place. If minimum public pensions are 
guaranteed, then there is no incentive for low-income people to participate in the funded system. 
If the Solidarity system provides a minimum guarantee rather than a supplemental payment, then 
low-income contributors face an effective 100% marginal tax rate on their DC contributions. 
Since some sort of minimum pension will be maintained, and since virtually any plausible 
actuarial simulation indicates that individual accumulations will be very small for low-income 
earners (Seitenova and Urzhumova, 2003), the gains from switching to an Accumulative system 
will accrue overwhelmingly to high-income groups, who are subject to the wage cap in the 
Solidarity system  
 
A successful Accumulative system aimed at promoting financial sector development also 
needs to have an economy capable of generating investment opportunities. Kazakhstan has 
produced a significant number of these, though less than in an ideal world.  The same potential 
was not seen to exist in Kyrgyzstan, which instead elected to develop a notional defined 
contribution accumulative account (NDC) system. Such a system is run by the state, and can be 
seen either as a Solidarity system that credits individuals primarily or exclusively for their 
recorded contributions, or equivalently as a publicly run Accumulative system that only buys 
government debt. 
 
While financial and economic aspects of pension reforms are important, the primary goal 
of any pension system (PAYGO, funded, or a multi-pillar system) should be the provision of 
adequate pension incomes to regular contributors (tax or pension contribution payers) in the 
country-specific economic and labor market setting. Countries contemplating reforms of their 
pension systems in the times of financial crises and significant social fund deficits tend to focus 
more on the short-term tasks of benefit reduction and longer-term tasks of financial and 
economic development, without due attention to future pension incomes. As a result, the model 
chosen may be far from the optimal solution of the problems faced by the existing social security 
system.   
Becker, Seitenova, & Urzhumova 
Pension reform in Kazakhstan and Central Asia: an overview 
Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research workshop on pension reform in transition economies 




The assessment of the efficiency of a pension system should also focus on the fairness 
and adequacy of pension incomes for regular contributors (not on the financial sector 
development). There are other instruments to promote the development of financial sector and 
the growth of the economy. If a pension system is chosen to facilitate the development of the 
financial sector and the growth of the economy, and regular contributors to this growth do not 
benefit from their contributions in the future, the new pension system may not be viewed as 
successful. Put differently, the use of pension system reforms to promote financial sector 
development may conflict with the fiduciary responsibility of individual pension funds to act 
solely in the interests of those whose assets they are managing (that is, future pensioners), and 
the implicit obligation of the state in this respect as well. Therefore, use of social security system 
design as a macro or financial policy instrument is best undertaken only in the absence of viable 
alternatives, and not as a first resort. 
 
Whether or not Kazakhstan had few or no alternatives ex ante (since it could not foresee 
the tripling of its oil prices) remains a matter of debate. The ex post problems discussed in Section 
III certainly are surprising. Currently, there are large amounts of assets accumulated in the 
pension system, while economic growth is mostly due to the oil and gas sector (which, however, 
draws international investments on a completely different scale), and problems with sound 
investments in the real sector remain. Kazakhstan thus has excess liquidity in the financial sector, 
with oil revenues and pension fund contributions accumulating in pension and bank sectors, and 
insufficient investment demand outside the minerals sector. High oil prices also have reduced the 
need for public budget deficit financing almost to zero, so that public debt issuance also has 
significantly decreased. In this setting, it is not surprising that real interest rates are negative.  
 
Thus, rapid growth in Accumulative system funds has been met with insufficient demand, 
creating a scenario in which mandatory savings across the population create excess supply of 
assets, and hence negative returns. As we see below, currency appreciation has made this 
situation worse rather than better. The mix of financial sector maturation with slower growth in 
the non-minerals’ sector at present implies financial losses borne by the working population, but 
during a time of economic boom in parts of the economy. Little if any of this was foreseen 
originally, but these problems provide an important warning: meeting objectives successfully 
does not guarantee that all the pieces will fit together, and hence that new problems will not 
emerge. In this case, Kazakhstan has enjoyed rapid economic growth, great success in generating  
Becker, Seitenova, & Urzhumova 
Pension reform in Kazakhstan and Central Asia: an overview 
Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research workshop on pension reform in transition economies 
1 April 2005 
25
 
Accumulative system funds, and corresponding financial sector development – and now faces 
hitherto unanticipated issues. Whether these are temporary or permanent will depend on events 
far outside the pension system. 
 
III.  BREAKING WITH THE PAST: ACCUMULATIVE SYSTEM REFORM IN KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Because Kazakhstan’s pension situation is well-known, and discussed in detail in 
Seitenova and Becker (2004), our emphasis here is on the events of the past two years. Briefly, in 
1998 Kazakhstan embarked on a dramatic Accumulative system reform. The stated intent was to 
have this second pillar replace the public Solidarity system. While this transition was intended to 
be gradual, the unanticipated oil wealth has pushed that horizon further back, and the 
dispassionate observer might well surmise that some sort of public safety net for the elderly and 
disabled will remain in place indefinitely. 
 
In 2001-2004 Kazakhstan experienced high economic growth with real GDP growth rate 
over 9% per year (Figure 3), due in large part to the growth of oil production induced by the 
high worldwide prices for oil. Annual oil export receipts doubled from $1 billion in 2001 to $2 
billion in 2004 (Moody, 2005). Other industries also experienced growth, although the growth 
rates were lower. Real wage growth rate averaged 8% per year. The deficit of the Republican 
Budget declined from 3.9% of GDP in 1998 to 0.1% of GDP in 2001 and 2002. 
 
The impacts of rapid economic growth on the PAYGO and funded (Accumulative) 
components of the Kazakhstan pension system have been quite different. The Solidarity system 
has benefited unambiguously; in contrast, while the Accumulative system generally bas benefited, 
unanticipated problems have arisen 
 
Impact on PAYGO system:  The increase of the formal sector employment along with 
a high growth of wages resulted in a significant increase in social tax collections (Figure 7). On 
the expenditure side, the number of beneficiaries gradually declined from 1997 to 2003 due to 
the elimination of favorable terms of retirement and retirement age increases (Figure 8). In 
addition, pension growth rates lagged behind the wage growth in 1997-2001 (Figure 9) as 
pensions were not fully adjusted to inflation over that period. 
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Figure 9.  Nominal Growth Rate of Beneficiaries' Benefit vs. 
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Starting in 2003, the Government took a number of measures to improve social 
indicators. The minimum statutory pension was increased 27% (much above inflation). Another 
sharp increase in the minimum pension by 59% was announced to take place in mid-2005. In 
addition, in 2003, pension benefit of each old-age pensioner who retired prior to 1998 was re-
calculated based on 2002 wage in the industry at which a pensioner worked prior to retirement, 
subject to the statutory wage cap for pension calculation. As a result, in 2003 the average pension 
for the stock of old-age retirees with complete service years almost doubled (Figure 9).  
 
Effective January 1, 2004, the Government replaced the old uniform social tax rate of 
21% by new regressive rates varying from 20% to 7% depending on the individual wage (with 
higher wages subject to lower tax rates). This was implemented to encourage proper reporting of 
wages by businesses (small businesses in particular) that tended to underreport their payroll 
because of the high tax burden. 
 
In 2003, the Government also began considering the possibility of reinstituting the 
solidarity system in the form of a guaranteed minimum pension (demogrant) to all complete-
service contributors irrespective of the accumulative pension (i.e.,  keeping the first tier instead of 
phasing it out). This change is highly likely to take place in the future, although the final decision 
has not been made as of January 2005. Another measure taken in 2003 was the adoption of Law 
“On Mandatory State Social Insurance” that introduces the second (state-insured) tier for  
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disability and survivorship benefits, to supplement the respective basic state benefits regulated by 
Law “on State Social Allowances”. 
 
Impact on the Accumulative System: As opposed to the Solidarity system, the high 
economic growth of the past 4 years has been a mixed blessing for the Accumulative system. 
Increased oil revenues resulted in a significant decline in budget deficits and, therefore, in the 
government need to issue debt. As a result, the government started issuing mostly short-term 
debt to fund short-term funding needs that occurred due to the seasonal fluctuations in 
government revenues. 
 
Since the major source of growth in the oil sector was funded through direct foreign 
investment, this growth did not result in an increase in the supply of corporate debt or equity 
instruments. At the same time, liquid funds were growing in both banking and pension fund 
sectors. Because of shortage of sound investments in other-than-oil sectors of the economy, 
banks could not significantly increase their loan portfolios and had to raise their securities 
portfolios instead, which added to growing pension fund demand for financial instruments. 
 
Excess demand for securities resulted in negative real returns on short-term instruments. 
The situation was further exacerbated by the low rates of return in international markets, so that 
Kazakhstan’s pension funds could not easily escape low domestic demand for funds and hence 
low domestic interest rates by buying foreign assets – even though the proportion of foreign 
assets a pension fund may hold in its portfolio is now 25%. 
 
As a result of Kazakhstan’s high economic growth and sharp the increase in dollar supply 
in the economy (from oil revenues), the tenge significantly appreciated against dollar by 2.4% in 
2003 and 9% in 2004. While inflation stayed at about 7% per year, this resulted in low demand 
for foreign investments and local dollar-denominated securities and increased demand for 
investments denominated in local currency. Table 4 shows the structure of the pension fund 
investment portfolios in 1998-2004. 
  
Becker, Seitenova, & Urzhumova 
Pension reform in Kazakhstan and Central Asia: an overview 
Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research workshop on pension reform in transition economies 
1 April 2005 
29
 
Table 4. Portfolio Structure of Accumulation Pension Funds, 1998-2004 
1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003 2004
Treasury Securities  95.71 91.28 70.05 53.77 35.64  29.94 16.92
including :            
short-term  (МЕККАМ) – T-bills  74.82 4.16 1.04 0.14  0.09  1.26 1.76
Bonds denominated in foreign currency (МЕКАВМ)  -  4.20 0.71 --  -- -- -- 
Medium-term  (МЕОКАМ)  5.61 -- 1.90  5.09  8.03  15.81 14.43
Long-term  (МЕОКАМ)  - --  -- 4.47  3.24  0.05 -- 
CPI-linked (МЕИКАМ)  - --  0.47  1.12  1.72  0.63 0.21
Bonds denominated in foreign currency (АВМЕКАМ)  -  47.26 --  --  -- -- -- 
Eurobonds (2002)  15.27 17.02 9.35  8.17  -- -- -- 
Eurobonds (2004)  - 18.63 20.80 14.32  10.11  3.30 -- 
Eurobonds (2007)  - -  35.79 20.46  12.45  8.89 0.52
 NBK Notes (Short-term)  1.96 2.40 4.33 4.90  12.24  23.18 36.60
Municipal securities  - 0.29 0.23 0.63  0.45  0.21 0.03
Foreign Non-government Securities  - 0.40 2.44 2.99  3.95  4.22 1.81
Foreign Government Securities  - -  -  -  3.69  2.39 0.14
Securities issued by international financial organizations  - 0.59 4.08 3.56  6.45  2.92 1.25
Non-government Securities by domestic issuers  0.37 1.96 15.89 23.22 27.93  29.73 35.58
including :            
Stocks  0.37 0.67 2.14 3.56  3.82  3.98 6.82
Bonds  - 1.29 13.75 19.67  24.12  25.75 24.82
including: mortgage-backed securities  - -  -  -  0.02  0.82 3.94
Deposits at commercial banks  0.32 1.64 2.55 8.44  8.78  6.85 10.90
Funds at investment account and other assets 
1.64 1.45 0.42 2.49  0.86  0.56 0.71
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00 100.00
 
Pension funds had to invest close to 50% of the portfolio in short-term instruments (T-
bills, NBK notes and deposits at commercial banks) in 2004 because of the lack of longer-term 
investments. Table 5 summarizes annual rates of return on NPF pension assets and government 
securities.  
Table 5.  Rates of Return on Pension Assets, Short-Term Treasuries and NBK 
Notes 
T-Bills (МЕККАМ)   NBK Notes  Medium-term Treasuries 
Effective 
annual rate of 
return 
Effective 
annual rate of 
return 
Effective annual 






























Dec-98 17.8 74.82  20.1 13.0 1.96 26.9 19.8 5.61  16.9 9.8 107.10
Dec-99 32.9  4.16  17.3 9.0 2.40 14.28 6.0   14.7 6.4 108.30
Dec-00 6.7 1.04  13.5 0.3 4.33 7.87 (5.3) 1.90  17.5 4.3 113.20
Dec-01 8.2 0.14  6.6 (1.8) 4.90 5.8 (2.6) 5.09  13.6 5.2 108.40
Dec-02 5.83  0.09  6.7 0.8 12.24 5.93 0.0 8.03  10.1 4.2 105.90
Dec-03 -0.34  1.26 5.9 (0.5) 23.18 5.18 (1.3) 15.81  7.1 0.6 106.44
Oct-04 -3.91  3.39 4.7 (2.2) 31.62 4.62 (2.3) 15.01  6.4 (0.5) 106.90
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Normally, rates of return on short-term treasuries are highly correlated with CPI and are 
largely determined by inflation expectations. According to the adaptive expectations theory, the 
inflation expectations of investors must have been be at the level of about 6-7%. It is therefore 
quite unusual for a government to sell short-term securities with below-expected-inflation 
nominal rates of return. However, as Moody (2005) discusses in detail, world real interest rates 
are currently extremely low, and Kazakhstan undoubtedly has excess liquidity at present. 
 
From an economic standpoint, the events of recent years are readily explicable. 
Kazakhstan embarked on a forced saving plan just as its natural savings rate soared, with oil 
revenue shrinking government dissavings and adding to corporate retained earnings. Domestic 
investment demand has grown, but not nearly as rapidly. Increasing non-speculative investment 
demand therefore should be a policy priority. 
 
The nation’s pension funds also can be accused of managing their assets poorly, since 
assets and liabilities are mismatched. Confident that the tenge would continue to depreciate 
against the dollar, funds tended to hold dollar-denominated assets. Their liabilities, however, are 
denominated in tenge. As the dollar has declined, pension funds then find themselves exposed. 
This is not at present a critical problem, since payments are still low. However, it does point to 
an unanticipated risk, and hence to a need to more carefully hedge assets. 
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IV.  KYRGYZSTAN: NOTIONAL DEFINED CONTRIBUTION REFORM AND RETREAT 
As Kazakhstan prepared its Accumulative system reform, Kyrgyzstan also found itself 
dealing with similar social budgetary problems, but with a more limited set of solutions. The 
setting, the proposals of different international institutions, and their anticipated consequences 
are discussed in detail in Becker and Paltsev (2001 and 2004). The presentation here is more 
interpretative, since published details already exist. 
 
Kyrgyzstan’s economic decline abated in 1996, and 1997 was a year of significant 
recovery. This was a period of optimism, and the Kyrgyzstani Government, World Bank, and 
other international bodies began exploring structural problems. Chief among these was the large 
social transfer problem in a country that was extremely poor. Tables 6 and 7 summarize the 
fiscal situation confronting the Government. Some 12% of the Kyrgyzstani population was 
receiving a pension, the system was running a large and growing deficit, and in any case was 
dependent on transfers from the Republican budget.  
 
Table 6  Kyrgyzstan pensioner population prior to reform (thousands) 
 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  % of all Pensioners, 1997
Old Age  448.7  443.9 439.3 437.8 80.7
Disabled 45.4  46.0 49.8 53.0 9.8
Survivors 44.8  46.0 48.6 50.2 9.3
Total 541.0  537.0 539.9 542.7 100.0
Population 4450.7  4512.4 4574.1 4634.9
Old Age Pensioners 
as a % of Population 
10.0 10.0 9.8 9.4  
Total Pensioners as 
a % of Population 
12.2 11.9 11.8 11.7  
(Source: Paltsev, 1999) 
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Table 7.  Kyrgyzstan Social Fund Revenues (million som)
9 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997  1998  1999 
Payroll Taxes  598.2 1111.5 1471.6 1770.1 2449.9  2481.9
State subventions and other 
revenues 
114.3 201.7 397.3 564.0 540.3 502.0
Total Social Fund revenue  712.5 1313.2 1868.9 2369.3 2990.2 2983.9
Transfers from State Budget as 
a % of Total SF Revenue 
16.0 15.4 21.3 23.8 18.1 16.8
  1998 (est)  1999 (plan)
Uncovered Deficit (Arrears) 18.4 23.7 79.4 8.0 194.0  262.6
State Subventions  - - - 446.2 344.0  300.0
Total Deficit  454.2 538.0  562.6
(Source: Paltsev, 1999) 
 
  The World Bank was the first international organization to become involved in a major 
way. The Bank and Kyrgyz Government worked out an extensive set of reforms, including 
measures to reduce arrears, eliminate in-kind payments, improve compliance, and move toward a 
national PIN number system with individual accounts. More controversially, the reform also 
included a gradual increase in retirement age to 63 for men and 58 for women – a move that was 
profoundly unpopular (as the June 15, 1998 headline in the nation’s largest newspaper, Vecherni 
Bishkek, termed it, “Stolen Old Age!”). The reforms also committed Kyrgyzstan to move to a 
NDC system, which attracted far less commentary than the rise in retirement age, perhaps in part 
because there was skepticism over the Social Fund’s ability to create and operate the requisite 
underlying information system. 
 
  The skeptics proved correct with respect to the NDC system. While the Social Fund did 
initiate pilot projects in which they created individual accounts, the database requirements were 
not funded externally, at least initially, and the Kyrgyzstan Government did not have the 
capability to fund the necessary IT infrastructure itself. At the same time, the Government was 
leery of committing to a high rate of return, and so credited individual accounts with nominal 
earnings below inflation rates. 
 
 
                                                           
9 Pension Fund arrears are defined as pensions that are supposed to be paid in a given year but are not paid.  It 
should be noted that numbers for 1997 and 1998 provided by the SF, as its estimates are questionable.  Numbers for 
1999 are from the Law on the budget of SF for 1999.  The total SF deficit (totally attributed to Pension Fund) is the 
sum of state subventions and uncovered deficit and, as such, for 1999 total deficit is planned at 562.6 million som.  
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TABLE 8. URBAN AND RURAL CURRENT BALANCES OF THE PENSION FUND 
(numbers are in million som; figures in italics below show % of GDP 
Identical fertility  Differential fertility   Total 
BASELINE  Urban Rural  Urban Rural 






































































(source: Becker and Paltsev, 2001; forecasts based on PROST 6 model using ADB parameters). 
 
  Becker and Paltsev (2001) argue that the Solidarity system in a country such as 
Kyrgyzstan should not be viewed as a single system. Rather, as Table 8 demonstrates, both 
current and projected future Kyrgyzstan Pension Fund balances differ dramatically if one divides 
the country into urban and rural areas. Taken as a whole, the 1997 Pension Fund deficit was 
about 2.5% of GDP (including budgeted transfers from the Republican government). However, 
the PAYGO system in urban Kyrgyzstan was actually in surplus, and was projected to remain in 
surplus for the next 40 years, even at present rules (though increasing the retirement age as 
committed). The deficit in fact is driven entirely by the large transfer to rural areas, which even in 
1997 was equal to nearly 3% of GDP (or about 6.5% of rural GDP). 
 
  Identifying the source of Kyrgyzstan’s deficit is quite different from doing something 
about it. If Kyrgyzstan is poor, rural Kyrgyzstan is very poor, and pension payments are a vital 
component of rural incomes. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan is roughly two-thirds rural, and 
parliamentarians from rural areas would strenuously oppose removal of this transfer. In 
pluralistic Kyrgyzstan, this opposition is sufficient to block major reforms to the pension system. 
However, it seems likely that even in rather less democratic Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the 
critical role played by the Solidarity pension system in transferring resources to poor rural areas 
will serve as a strong constraint to dismantling the current system.   
 
  The Solidarity system deficit forecasts in Table 8 point to another key feature, namely 
that of shrinking pension budget deficits during the period from 1997 to roughly 2008. This  
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period corresponds to retirement of small wartime birth cohorts. One way to look at this is that 
the large deficits of the mid-1990s were temporary, driven by large retirement populations and 
economic implosion, so that there is little need to panic and introduce rushed reforms. 
Alternatively, one could view the period 1997-2008 as a window of opportunity during which 
any transition costs or dislocations of moving to a new pension system would be relatively 
modest. 
 
  As noted, Kyrgyzstan also chose to introduce a major pension reform. In 1996-1997, 
Kyrgyzstan adopted two major laws to reform the pension system: ON STATE PENSION SOCIAL 
INSURANCE, and ON NON-GOVERNMENT PENSION FUNDS IN KYRGYZ REPUBLIC. The state pension 
law regulates old age, disability and survivorship benefits. The major changes to the old social 
security system are as follows: 
•  Every January 1 of each year, from 1999 to 2006, the retirement age is increased by 4 
months from 60/55 to 63/58 years for males/females. 
•  The individual pension is divided into two parts: base and insured. The base pension is 
a part of the individual pension guaranteed and set by the Government. The same 
amount is paid as a base pension to all retirees with complete contribution years (25/20 
years for males/females) in the state social insurance system. The insured pension 
requires individual record-keeping of participation in the system and is calculated as the 
amount accumulated at the individual “notional” account multiplied by an actuarial 
coefficient.
10  The coefficient is to be set annually based on the age of retirement and life 
expectancy at that age according to the population statistics provided by the National 
Statistical Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Government adjusts the amount 
accumulated at an individual account annually. The adjustment shall not exceed 75% of 
the nominal wage growth in the respective year.  
•  Disability benefits are set at either 100% or 50% of the old-age benefit depending on the 
severity of disability.  The eligibility to receive a disability benefit depends on a specified 
number of insured years that varies from 1 to 5 years for different age groups.  
•  Survivorship benefits are set at the levels from 50% to 150% of the full disability benefit 
(depending on the number of dependents) that a deceased breadwinner would receive if 
he/she were to become disabled instead of dying.  
                                                           
10 Prior to the establishment of individual record-keeping systems the insured part is calculated as 1% times the 
number of service years, times monthly wage. At that stage, a cap of 15 minimum statutory wages applies for 
pension calculation. 
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•  The state pension law declares the right of each individual for a voluntarily state pension 
social insurance introduced in addition to the mandatory system. 
 
This design amounts to a three-pillar system, with the second pillar (the insured part) 
being a notional defined contribution accumulative account (NDC) system. Such a system is run 
by the state, and can be seen either as a Solidarity system that credits individuals primarily or 
exclusively for their recorded contributions, or equivalently as a publicly run Accumulative 
system that only buys government debt. In fact, the system has remained a 100% PAYGO 
system, since neither the base pension nor the insured parts are funded. Regarding the third 
(voluntary) pillar, in the Central Asian context, voluntary, private, funded, DC arrangements are 
virtually meaningless, since there is little demand for them. These anticipated private funds were 
regulated by the second law, which  regulates the establishment, capital requirements, state 
registration and licensing, as well as operational and investment activities of non-government 
pension funds.  
 
Despite having one of the worst tax compliance records in Central Asia, the Kyrgyzstan 
Government chose to maintain all major favorable terms of retirement that existed in the Soviet 
social security system (i.e., early retirement for a number of occupations). The Government also 
maintained the liberal notion of service years including, for example, years spent in university 
study and maternal leave.  
 
In 2004, the contribution rate to the State Pension Insurance Fund was 29%, with 21% 
paid by employer (of which 3% went to the Solidarity base part and 18% to individual insured 
part) and 8% paid by employee (with 3% going to the Solidarity part and 5% to the individual 
insured part). From 1997 to 2004, the total (base + individual parts) employer contribution rate 
decreased from 29% to 21%, and employee contribution increased from 2% to 8%. Indeed, 
Kyrgyzstan provides an excellent example of the tendency in former Soviet republics for social 
tax rates to be constantly adjusted (Table 9). These ongoing shifts obviously do little to instill 
faith in the public pension system, and their high levels provide strong incentives to evade 
obligations.  
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TABLE 9. Allocation of Social Fund contributions to Government Social Insurance 
programs, 1994-2004 (All numbers expressed as percentage of net wage) 
including to: 
including to:  including to Medical 
Insurance of  
 
  
total   Pension 











Fund  Employees Pensioners 
Total   35.5                         
Employer's contributions  33  28.05      4.95  1.5       
Employee's contribution  2.5          0.5       
1994 
including working disabled                   
Total  35.5                
Employer's contributions  33          1.5       
Employee's contribution  2.5         0.5       
1995 
including working disabled                   
Total                  
Employer's contributions  33          1.5       
Employee's contribution  2.5         0.5        1996 
including working disabled                   
Total  39                
Employer's contributions  36.5  29.04      3.96  1.5  2  36.5   
Employee's contribution  2.5  2        0.5        1997 
including working disabled                   
Total  39                
Employer's contributions  34 27.5      3  1.5  2  34   
Employee's contribution  5  4.5        0.5        1998 
including working disabled  2 1.5        0.5       
Total  39                
Employer's contributions  33  26.5      3  1.5  2  33   
Employee's contribution  6  5.5        0.5        1999 
including working disabled  2.5  2        0.5       
Total  38                
Employer's contributions  31  25.5      2  1.5  2     
Employee's contribution  7  6.5        0.5        2000 
including working disabled  2  2               
Total  33                
Employer's contributions  25  21.5  1  0.5  2     
Employee's contribution  8  7.5    0.5        2002 
including working disabled  2  2 
subject to supervisory 
board decision 
       
Total  33                
Employer's contributions  25  21.5      1  0.5  2  1.5  0.5 
Employee's contribution  8  7.5        0.5        2003 
including working disabled                   
Total  34                
Employer's contributions  24  21  3  18  1    2     
Employee's contribution  8  8  3  5           
2004 
including working disabled  2  2               
 
  Seven years after its initial reform, Kyrgyzstan has not effectively dealt with its pension 
problems. Private, voluntary pension funds have an insignificant impact, though the Zhogorku 
Kenesh as of 2004 was devoting effort to rewrite its bill on on-government pension funds 
(Alymbekov, 2004). One would expect this to have little impact – though there might be a very 
modest effect if Kazakhstani private pension funds were allowed to operate in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
  It is difficult to imagine substantial achievement in providing larger Solidarity pensions, 
much less adding an effective NDC second pillar, and certainly before developing a third private  
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voluntary pillar, without greater economic recovery. As we have noted above, Kyrgyzstan’s real 
GDP lies far below its Soviet-era peak. Although real GDP at factor cost was 38% larger in 2002 
than in the 1995 nadir (ADB, 2003), this level was still 30% below the 1990 figure. In terms of 
per capita GDP at official exchange rates, Kyrgyzstan’s level was only one-fifth that of 
neighboring Kazakhstan in 2001 (World Bank, 2003), and the gap has to a factor of roughly 1:8. 
While at PPP exchange rates the gap is much narrower, with per capita income in Kyrgyzstan 
roughly 2/5 that of Kazakhstan’s level by this measure in 2001, the gap continues to widen. The 
PPP development measure suggests that Kyrgyzstan is slightly better off than India or Bolivia, 
but below Indonesia or Ecuador – none of which have comprehensive welfare systems. 
 
  Yet Kyrgyzstan has taken only modest efforts to reduce its pension burden. Data from 
www.cisstat.com indicate that, while the numbers receiving state pensions declined 12.0% in 
Kazakhstan between 1998, at the outset of reforms, and 2003, the decline was only 4.2% in 
Kyrgyzstan, and that number would be due mainly to the wartime cohort retirement effect and 
retirement age increases. Average monthly pension in dollar terms was about the same in 2003 as 
in 1998 in both countries (about $54 in Kazakhstan, and just under $13 in Kyrgyzstan); since 
Kazakhstan has had faster growth, this implies a far larger replacement rate decline there than in 
Kyrgyzstan.  
 
  This continued commitment to maintaining social spending means that in 2002, some 
15.0% of government expenditures went to social security and welfare (ADB, 2003), a rise from 
13.0% in 1998, though below the utterly unsustainable 20.4% recorded in 1995. Another 9.8% of 
2002 public expenditures went to public health. It should be emphasized that these are large 
amounts for a country at Kyrgyzstan’s level of economic development, and together they imply 
that expenditures on other areas such as education (22.1%) and economic services (12.5%) must 
be constrained. To get a sense of how these numbers look, let us compare them to public 
expenditure shares in Malaysia, a wealthier but comparably pluralistic nation. There, social 
security and welfare accounts for only 4.6% of government expenditures; health spending is 
6.4%. However, education (28.1%) and economic services (17.6%) receive much larger shares. 
 
  These figures point to Kyrgyzstan’s dilemma. There is enormous pressure from the 
electorate to maintain social spending. As a poor nation, the intended target population is needy 
by any reasonable standard; as most have few viable alternative income sources, or means of 
purchasing healthcare, their claims are socially legitimate. Yet the opportunity cost of these  
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expenditures is high, and likely not well appreciated. Educational standards have greatly 
deteriorated in Kyrgyzstan since independence, and, obviously, future productivity depends on 
the quality of today’s schooling. At the same time, economic growth requires infrastructure 
development and maintenance: joining the WTO is not enough.  
 
IV.  UZBEKISTAN’S NEW ACCUMULATIVE SYSTEM 
Uzbekistan has long resisted pension system reforms of the sort that occurred in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and, for that matter, has resisted a wide range of liberalizing 
reforms.  A very tentative step was taken this past January, however, when one percentage point 
of individual payroll taxes were to be directed to individual accumulation accounts.
11 These 
accounts are to be on top of the standard Solidarity system. 
 
How this system progresses of course remains to be seen, but there is unquestionably an 
air of unreality about it. Accumulations equal to one percent of one’s net income will not grow 
into a large amount in any country. This is especially true in Uzbekistan, where wages are low, 
and where fluctuating laws and still imperfect property rights encourage employers and 
employees to hide incomes. As this 1% tax is an obligation placed on employers, it adds further 
incentive for employers to understate employment and wages (Asrorov, 2005). 
 
The question of interest concerns why Uzbekistan’s policymakers have opted for such a 
tentative approach. A possible answer is that the problem is one that is looming, but not yet 
severe. As the figures in Section 1 indicate, Uzbekistan has a young population by the standards 
of its northern neighbors, and hence a low dependency rate. This will eventually change, but not 
for some time. On the contrary, in comparison with 1989, Uzbekistan’s old age dependency rate 
has been stable at 7% (Table 1), while its child dependency rate has fallen from 75% to 60%. 
This latter decline is driven by a precipitous fall in TFRs (Figure 2), which, however, still remain 
well above replacement levels. 
 
On the other hand, effective dependency ratios (Table 3) have risen, as the size of the 
formal sector labor force declines. Furthermore, Uzbekistan has been more determined than its 
other Central Asian neighbors to maintain replacement rates, which are far higher than in other 
                                                           
11 The new law itself is available online (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2005). An English language summary appears in 
UzReport.com (2004). For an analysis of the new system, see Mukhitdinov (2005). For a far more negative 
interpretation, see Asrorov (2005). Zabikhodzhaev et al. (2002) provide underlying analysis. 
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republics (Figure 5; also see Zabikhodzhaev et al., 2002, from whom all uncited figures in this 
section are drawn). This requires high payroll taxes (37.3 payroll tax from employers, and 2.5% 
from employees); as roughly 11% of the population receives a pension, pension expenditures 
must comprise an important share of the government budget – though at present this figure 
appears to have increased to 13%.
12  The system is further complicated by agricultural reforms in 
Uzbekistan: as private farming emerges, most individual farmers prefer not to participate in the 
social welfare system, and engaging the private farming sector is an important task. 
 
The Government’s response, as outlined in a law (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2005) and 
supporting resolution, both enacted in December 2004, is to open individual accumulation 
pension accounts for all employed persons at the state owned Halk (Narodnyi) Bank. In 
principle, the safety of these accumulated funds will be guaranteed by the state through Ministry 
of Finance and Central Bank. The Halk Bank is required to accurately manage these accounts, to 
pay an interest rate not less than 75% of the National Bank’s refinance rate, to make payments of 
accumulated pensions to citizens at their places of residence, and to regularly provide information 
to asset holders about the status (and presumably, value) of their individual accounts. The 
Government is considering “recommending” that Halk Bank provide all these services free of 
charge in exchange for extension of its current tax privileges for an additional three years. 
 
The law and resolution envision the development of a three-pillar system, ostensibly along 
the lines of the original James Report, with full operation by 2007. The new pension system 
contains a minimum pension, guaranteed by the state and fixed by the government, paid in the 
same amount to all pensioners who are entitled to a full pension, irrespective of their Solidarity 
contributions. This corresponds to the “demogrant” concept now popular at the World Bank. In 
principle, the state-guaranteed minimum pension will be funded by employers’ contributions. 
This in turn will be supplemented by the Accumulative component held at the Halk Bank, which 
is directed to maintain individual accumulation accounts for each contributing worker. 
 
It is difficult to imagine that this reform was undertaken with the support of the World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank, or any of the bilateral aid agencies, and we are unable to find 
any record suggesting otherwise. In part, the international finance and bilateral aid agencies 
presumably are more concerned with more fundamental issues in Uzbekistan, including 
                                                           
12 We are grateful to Eshrev Trushin for this assessment, as well as for the content of the following two paragraphs.  
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economic liberalization, currency convertability, increasing transparency, agricultural 
development, and private business development. More fundamentally, international advocates of 
Accumulative system reforms would expect something more than an almost nominal 1% 
contribution, and likely would be unenthusiastic about having a single fund holder. Finally, the 
Uzbekistan Government has long followed self-designed economic policies, and is wary of 
wholesale adaptation of new policies from the outside. 
 
While the Uzbekistani Government is illiberal and not terribly receptive to foreign advice, 
this story is not a simple matter of an obstinate government of a remote country rejecting 
competent international advice. On the contrary, the enacted law has several “best practice” 
measures not commonly adopted elsewhere, starting with the demogrant. In addition, the law 
allows for voluntary private contributions (the third pillar). It also makes all contributions 
exempt from taxation (Article 9), and in so doing does not distinguish between mandatory and 
voluntary contributions. It further establishes a simple payment mechanism (Article 19): retirees 
are entitled to receive either a lump sum withdrawal at retirement, or they may opt for scheduled 
withdrawals of varying duration, arranged by them in agreement with Halk Bank. Unexhausted 
funds are passed on to survivors as a bequest in the event that that the holder of an account dies. 
 
One can see the Uzbekistan Government’s strategy as one that forces each worker to 
make a nominal contribution, which in turn means that Halk Bank will create an individual 
account. The second pillar in effect sets up the infrastructure: more substantial contributions are 
then up to the individual. Given tax exemption, it is possible that more prosperous Uzbekistanis 
will find these individual accounts to be highly attractive (and, conceivably, a mechanism for 
cleansing ill-gotten money). In a flight of fancy, one could almost describe this as a libertarian 
pension welfare system, with a small demogrant, a minimum mandatory contribution, and 
incentives to build individual accounts. 
 
This, of course, would be an overstatement. There is only one bank authorized to receive 
and manage these contributions (though it is not impossible that Halk Bank could offer a range 
of funds). Exactly what assets are permitted investments by Halk Bank remains unclear: Article 
28 states simply that diversification requirements, the maximum percentage held as shares, and 
the list of acceptable instruments “will be determined by the Ministry of Finance and the Central 
Bank.” In the current economic environment, it seems likely that firms, workers, and those with 
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large, undeclared savings will be cautious about placing their assets in any bank, much less a 
state-owned one: the rules are always subject to change. 
 
It is perhaps best to regard the current reform as potentially positive, but secondary in 
importance to other events in the Uzbek economy and polity. Accumulative system growth, 
whether mandatory or voluntary, will require further economic liberalization, private sector 
development, and overall economic growth (ignoring the remote chance that Halk Bank is 
allowed to hold international index funds). The basic PAYGO system is not in serious trouble, 
but it is destined to be a greater social burden in the future. This is ensured by population aging, 
coupled with the same rise in premature retirement seen elsewhere in Central Asia 
(Zabirhodzhaev et al., 2002) and continued Soviet-era early retirement dates. 
 
 
V.  IMPENDING REFORM IN TAJIKISTAN – THE DISTANT HORIZON 
 
We have seen in the preceding sections that Tajikistan might have suffered most of all 
from the collapse of the USSR. Clearly, its capacity to operate a national social security system is 
extremely limited, as one would expect from a country with a 2001 GDP of USD 1.1 billion, 
implying per capita GDP of $170, or $1150 at PPP exchange rates (World Bank, WDR 2003), 
which places Tajikistan in the global rankings between Kenya ($1020) and Uganda ($1250). 
While the economy grew by more than 62% in real terms from 1999-2004 (www.cisstat.com), 
this mainly reflects the extent to which the economy had declined: even in PPP terms, per capita 
income in Tajikistan is at best one-sixth that of Kazakhstan. 
 
What distinguishes Tajikistan from other very low-income economies is that it retains the 
core of a comprehensive welfare state. As can be seen from Table 10, more than one half 
million people – some 9% of Tajikistan’s population – theoretically receives a state pension. 
These payments are not large, averaging only $2.54/month in 2001 and $4.27/month in 2003. 
However, in an economy of very high unemployment and in which many have no cash income, 
these payments almost certainly are important to many. 
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Table 10. Pensions and Pensioner Population, Tajikistan 2001-2003 
Numbers (thousand)  Average monthly pension (somoni)   
2001 2003  2001  2003 











Old age pensioners 
Disabled 
Loss of breadwinner 




















National population (thousand)  6,200.0  
Somoni/dollar 2.37  3.06
Notes: We are grateful to Ilhom Bobiev of the National Bank of Tajikistan for providing these data. 
Disability pension payments are for workplace injuries/general illnesses. 
 
  It is difficult to imagine running a comprehensive welfare state in a country as poor as 
Tajikistan, even given its high rate of economic growth. We do not have information about 
payment arrears, payment in kind, and complete failure to pay (which could occur if 
responsibility takes place at the regional level), but it seems likely that such problems do exist. 
Given that the Tajikistani Government is focusing primarily on economic development, it almost 
certainly is interested in reducing its social commitments, though this should be taken as 
speculative rather than informed comment. Toward that end, the Government is now 
committed to a gradual introduction, in stages, of a pension guarantee system, based on (a) a 
guaranteed state pension to members of the older generation, and (b) an accumulative pension 
system for current workers.
13 
 
  To our knowledge, this commitment is largely notional. Virtually no published news 
reports are available, in contrast to the widespread publicity surrounding the new policies in 
Uzbekistan, or even the limited changes in Kyrgyzstan. The only published document we found 
that mentions pension reform is a World Bank (2004) document in English, which notes tersely 
(p.32) “Decision of reforming the social insurance pension systems was adopted by the 
Government in 1999. Implementation of this measure is delayed for lack of funds.” It goes on to 
mention that the Government has requested Bank support in its 2004-2006 public investment 
program for a personalized registration system and supporting information system infrastructure. 
The World Bank as of June 2004 did not make such a commitment, and it would appear that 
                                                           
13 We are grateful to Ilhom Bobiev of the National Bank of Tajikistan for this information.  
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such support is not imminent. Rather, the Bank’s social policy focus is on developing capacity to 
meet the needs of the most destitute, building public sector delivery capability, dealing with 
health and education crises, and designing targeted assistance programs to reach the most 
vulnerable (World Bank, 2003a). By definition, pension and other social welfare payments 
mechanisms hit a broad spectrum of the population: being realistic, the international agencies 
expect to emphasize narrower targets for some time. Neither of the core World Bank strategy 
reports on Tajikistan expect to further pension reform as an element of the anti-poverty strategy. 
Gleason (2001) provides a detailed discussion of the various international agencies’ development 
projects and policy objectives in Tajikistan. These are wide ranging, from drug control, to 
improved governance, to privatization, agricultural reform, and health measures – but pension 
reform is not among the many items analyzed. 
 
  The surprising feature of Tajikistan’s pension system is not that reform is notional rather 
than imminent, but rather that the Government continues to make payments of any sort. 
Presumably, the practice of making small but widespread payments cannot be abandoned for 
political reasons: not only would it be highly unpopular, but it might signal further weakness and 
possible collapse of the Rakhmonov administration. Given that the Tajikistani state is “not fully 
consolidated” (in the diplomatic words of Luong, 2003), any demonstrated further loss of 
capacity could be politically disastrous. Conversely, the rise in average pensions – tiny in dollar 
value, but large in percentage increase terms – may signal the gradual reestablishment of central 
state capacity, and do so more effectively than any alternative expenditure.  
 
VI.  IS THE RUSH TO REFORM NECESSARY? 
 
Three of Central Asia’s nations have now embarked on substantial pension reforms. The 
diversity of the approaches is striking. However, while the new Uzbekistan model contains many 
excellent design features, it does not address the underlying issue of long run Solidarity system 
solvency under the current rules. This criticism may turn out to merely reflect a short-term 
problem – though it is one that has been recognized for some time. The reforms in Kyrgyzstan 
have been bolder, if only because they came earlier, and involved an increase in retirement age. 
Nonetheless, one cannot but conclude that these reforms do not come close to addressing the 
problem of unsustainable obligations. 
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Kazakhstan’s reform, in contrast, does appear to have dealt with the pension burden in a 
sustainable manner. While coherent design has played a role in this, the combination of high oil 
and minerals’ prices, highly competent execution of the reforms, and transparent, efficient 
regulation and management of the funds all were critical. These features, however, do not make 
Kazakhstan a role model: other countries cannot count on an export boom, and few can expect 
adroit implementation of a radically new system. Moreover, the successes to date have 
engendered a new set of problems which, while not fatal, also cannot be ignored. 
 
Many of the pension system reform decisions were made by Central Asia’s governments 
in moments of great pressure, if not crisis, and it is easy to note flaws in these systems’ designs. 
However, this is cheap criticism, and in any event, the past cannot be undone. We do believe 
that many decisions were taken in excessive haste, and that the remedy for this is ongoing, 
deliberate analysis and debate in each country. In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and in other low-
income countries with substantial welfare states but without immediate prospect for substantial 
financial sector development (including Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), the challenge is to 
continue to improve the Solidarity system. The essence of this will be to shrink total costs while 
minimizing harm to needy individuals, and this means improved targeting. It also means clearly 
delineating beneficiaries of various programs, and explicitly rather than covertly directing 
resources toward some groups at the expense of others. Put differently, the choice among 
expenditures on education, public health, and pension payments – and showcase investments – 
should be made openly. 
 
In Kazakhstan the challenge is quite different. Kazakhstan is a middle-income country 
likely to become and upper-middle country before long, and at present on track to reach 
developed country status by its target date, 2030. As Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore have found 
already, though, progress becomes increasingly difficult, and apparent shortcuts often are simply 
dead-ends. The rapid growth of recent years has been extremely uneven, giving Kazakhstan 
many features in common with Latin American countries. To continue to enjoy rapid growth, 
quality education, skills, and infrastructure must reach virtually the entire population, while 
economic diversification is needed to reduce dependency on a few sectors, and poverty pockets 
must be combated. There are many elements to this; from the perspective of pension reform, the 
challenge is to ensure that the Accumulative system does not create a large number of elderly 
poor alongside a moderate number of prosperous retirees, and also to generate investment 
demand to absorb the new domestic savings pools.  
Becker, Seitenova, & Urzhumova 
Pension reform in Kazakhstan and Central Asia: an overview 
Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research workshop on pension reform in transition economies 




Alymbekov, Kubatbek, 2004. The development of institutional investors and pension funds in Kyrgyzstan. 
Istanbul: OECD Centre for Private Sector Development, Sixth Conference on Financial Sector Development 
in the Central Asian Countries, Azerbaijan and Mongolia. 
 
Anderson, Barbara A. and Bruce D. Silver, 1997. Issues of data quality in assessing mortality trends and levels 
in the New Independent States. In: National Research Council (Ed.), Premature Death in the new 
Independent States. National Academy Press, Washington, DC. 
 
Anderson, Kathryn and Richard Pomfret, 2003. Consequences of Creating a Market Economy: Evidence from 
Household Surveys in Central Asia. Cheltenham, UK: Edgar Elgar. 
 
Asian Development Bank, 2003. Key Indicators 2003. Manila: ADB. 
 
Asrorov, Akram, 2005 (February 10). Pochemu v Uzbekistane malenkie pensii. Asia-plus. 
www.asiaplus.tj/article4.htm.  
 
Becker, Charles M., Damira I. Bibosunova, Grace E. Holmes, and Margarita M. Ibragimova M. M. 1998. 
Maternal Care vs. Economic Wealth and the Health of Newborns: Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic and Kansas 
City, USA.. World Development, 26(11), 2057-2072. 
 
Becker, Charles M. and David D. Hemley. 1998. "Demographic Change in the Former Soviet Union 
during the Transition Period." World Development, 26(11): 1957-1976. 
 
Becker, Charles M., Erbolat N. Musabek, Ai-Gul Seitenova, and Dina Urzhumova, 2005. The migration 
response to economic shock: lessons from Kazakhstan.” Journal of Comparative Economics 33(1): 107-132. 
 
Becker, Charles M. and Sergey V. Paltsev. 2004. “Economic consequences of demographic change in the 
former USSR: social transfers in the Kyrgyz Republic,” World Development 32(11): 1849-1870. 
 
Becker, Charles M., and Sergey V. Paltsev. 2001. Macro-Experimental Economics in the Kyrgyz Republic: 
Social Security Sustainability and Pension Reform. Comparative Economic Studies, 43(4), 1-34. 
 
Becker, Charles M., and Dina S. Urzhumova. 1998. Pension Burdens and Labor Force Participation in 
Kazakhstan. World Development, 26(11), 2087-2103. 
 
Becker, Charles M., and Dina S. Urzhumova. 2005. Mortality recovery and stabilization in Kazakhstan. 
Economics and Human Biology 3(1): 97-122. 
 
Becker, Charles M., Ai-Gul S. Seitenova, and Dina S. Urzhumova. 2000 (July). Long-Run Fiscal Costs of State 
Pensions and Social Allowances. Astana, Kazakhstan: Ministry of Finance, Second Annual Report to the 
World Bank in compliance with conditions of the PRIL (pension reform implementation) loan. 
 
Becker, Charles M., Ai-Gul S. Seitenova, and Dina S. Urzhumova. 2000a (July). Adequacy of Pensions for 
Different Groups of Employees and Recommendations for Actions Necessary to Adequately Address Identified Retirement 
Income Deficiencies. Astana, Kazakhstan: Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, Second Annual Report to 
the World Bank in fulfillment of a conditionality for the continued disbursement of a PRIL (pension 
reform implementation) loan. 
 
Gleason, Gregory, 2002. Structural reform in low-income transition countries of Central Asia, 1991-2001. 
Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico, Department of Political Science, unpublished manuscript 
presented at the 2002 meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA. 
  
Becker, Seitenova, & Urzhumova 
Pension reform in Kazakhstan and Central Asia: an overview 
Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research workshop on pension reform in transition economies 
1 April 2005 
46
 
Luong, Pauline Jones, 2003. Political obstacles to economic reform in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan  : strategies to move ahead. New Haven, CT: Yale University, unpublished manuscript, 
presented at the Lucerne Conference of the CIS-7 Initiative. 
 
Moody, Stephen S., 2005. “Kazakhstan’s term structure of rates.”  Rynok Tsennykh Bymag (Securities Market), 
forthcoming. 
 
Mukhitdinov, E. 2005 (January). Pension reform: perspectives on introducing an accumulative pension 
system (in Russian). Byulletenj Finansovoj rynki Uzbekistana, pp. 49-54. 
 
National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (NSCKR). 2004 (November). Demograficheskii 
Ezhegodnik Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki. 1999-2003. Bishkek: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. http://stat-gvc.bishkek.su/Rus/News/Publ_Demogr.html.  
 
Paltsev, Sergey V. 1999. Kyrgyzstan’s pension system today. Bishkek and Arlington, VA: IMCC for the 
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Bank TA No. 2963-KGZ, Pension Reform Technical 
Assistance Project to the Kyrgyz Republic, Background Paper 3, unpublished, internal document. 
 
Republic of Uzbekistan, 2005 (February 14). O nakopiteljnom pensionnom obespechenii grazhdan. Biznes i Pravo. 
www.bizneslaw.uz/5_6/st5_5.htm.  
 
Seitenova, Ai-Gul S. and Charles M. Becker. 2004 (December). “Kazakhstan’s pension system: pressures 
for change and dramatic reforms.” Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 45(2): 151-187. 
 
Seitenova, Ai-Gul S. and Dina S. Urzhumova. 2003. Actuarial Assessment of Pension System Options in 
Kazakhstan. Almaty: Kazakhstan Actuarial Center (unpublished report to the World Bank). 
 
Uzreport, 2004 (December 22). [no title] www.uzreport.com/E/index.cfm?sec=13&subsec=61&n_ID=15314  
 
World Bank, 1994.  Averting the Old Age Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
World Bank, 2003. World Development Report 2003. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
World Bank, 2003a. Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive 
Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Tajikistan. Washington, DC: World Bank, report no. 
25329-TJ. 
 
World Bank, 2004. Tajikistan: Joint IDA-IMF Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper Annual Progress Report. Washington, DC: World Bank, report no. 29207-TJ. 
 
Zabikhodzhaev, R., A. Navotnyi, A. Nabikhodzhaev, Ya. Faizullaev, and D. Musaev, 2002. Pension system 
attainment and analysis of the possibility of creating non-government accumulative pension funds in 
Uzbekistan (Совершенствование  пенсионной  системы  и  анализ  возможности  создания 
негосударственных  накопительных  пенсионных  фондов  в  Узбекистане).  Tashkent: Center for 
Economic Analysis. 